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Faulconer Responds to Jackson, Fischer, and Hansen
James Faulconer
Brigham Young University

I

want to thank Aaron Jackson, Kristin Hansen, and
Lane Fischer for taking the time to respond to me. I
recognize that their doing so is a gesture of kindness, and
I appreciate what they have done.
I am grateful to Jackson for recommending Kelly
Oliver’s Witnessing: Beyond Recognition. One might understand my presentation as a description of how four
Abrahamic religions understand themselves and their relations to each other. Oliver argues that the philosophical theme of recognition—a subject recognizing herself
as a subject—is insufficient for understanding human
personhood and, therefore, for understanding human
relation. Since the early modern period, most Western
philosophical thought has understood human relation
in terms of recognition. But for all their talk of persons
being face-to-face, because they understand the world
in terms of subjects and objects those philosophies ultimately demand that persons prove themselves worthy of
being-recognized: a person is an object of a certain worth,
and anyone claiming fully to be a person must prove that
she has that worth. The most that such views can give us
is a view of human beings as in perpetual conflict that is
ameliorated by the assertion of or demand for rights. In
place of a theory of recognition, Oliver uses the work of
Emmanuel Levinas as the foundation for her argument
for a theory of witness: we do not demand or recognition of our selves or offer recognition of others, but we
witness our relations with one another. Oliver provides
a way of thinking about how persons of different faith

traditions might “live together in love” (D&C 42:45) and
adds a needed dimension to the story that I outlined.
Fischer is right that not all Mormons would articulate
the relation between Mormonism and the law as I have.
That’s one of the things I like about being a Mormon: we
have wide bounds within which to stretch our minds, and
we need not all agree about anything but the most central
matters. In spite of that I don’t think that Fischer and
I disagree much, though the clumsiness of my expression may have made it appear that we do. He argues that
we must understand our relation to the law as but one
aspect of our religion, with our relation to Christ, with
whom we are yoked, as the other. Fischer deftly shows
that this double yoke solves Heinz’s dilemma differently
than would one nursed on a Kohlbergian understanding
of moral maturity: Fischer’s response to the dilemma is
that he cannot think about what should be done in such
a case without taking into account both the law and his
relationship to a person, namely God, and therefore also
all other persons. I agree wholeheartedly.
I may require my writing students to read Hansen’s
précis of my essay as an example of someone summarizing another’s work accurately. And she follows that
summary with an excellent piece on perspective in psychology, using Rychlak’s thinking to address the question of whether and how it is possible to understand the
perspective of someone else. According to Hansen I have
dealt with the difficulty of teasing apart “the intertwining of process and content” and by doing so have shown
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the value of an introspective perspective. But I have not
recognized that “multiple perspectives [can] be valid independent of whether one is better than another,” instead
wanting “to claim that the introspective perspective is
more valid than another.”
As evidence Hansen takes up my claim that belief is
not enough to understand a religion and argues that,
indeed, there is a valid perspective from which one can
distinguish between religions solely on the basis of belief. She then uses that argument to generalize about the
place of third-person perspective in pscyhological theorizing, arguing that therapists sometimes “resort to the
language of an extraspective perspective in their theorizing, reducing the client’s challenges to biological and environmental causes.” In doing so, “they undo the healing
empathy they have given to clients whose problems, from
an introspective perspective, could be said to stem from a
history of being objectified and treated without empathy
by primary caregivers.” To that I say “amen.”
My only disagreement with Hansen is a mild one. In
fact, it is not so much a disagreement as it is a correction
of what I said: I did not intend to argue that only the
introspective approach is valid or even that it is better.
Indeed, one can distinguish between religions by talking about the beliefs of each. Perhaps I became carried
away with my rhetoric and made it appear that I don’t

value the third-person perspective. My view is that understanding a religion must go beyond understanding its
beliefs. But I don’t think that means that one can only
resort to introspection, that one must understand what
it existentially feels like to be a practitioner—though introspection is also a valid way of understanding. I believe
that the understanding I was recommending was an extraspective one: understanding religion is more than understanding belief, it is also understanding such things as
rites, practices, and social structures, all of which can be
described from a third-person point of view and not only
from a first.
Though I did not make the useful distinction between
kinds of perspectives that Hansen points out, I think I
have been more guilty of not recognizing the introspective than the extraspective. But even if that is true, there
is a solid point to Hansen’s criticism: had I thought
more clearly and carefully about the difference between
the two perspectives, I assume that I could have more
clearly explained the four approaches to the law without
often appealing to the introspective and sometimes to the
extraspective but not recognizing that I was depending
on different perspectives and mixing them in a way that
could give the impression that I favor introspection.
Thank you all. �
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